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EFFECT OF PURCHASE OF TAX TITLE BY
MORTGAGEE AS AGAINST MORTGAGOR
WmLM A. COOK :"
The recent case of DeLine et ai v. De Laine et al.,1 decided
October 8, 1947, presented to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, for the first time, the question whether a mortgagee
may, as against a mortgagor, purchase at a tax sale and there-
by obtain a title which will defeat the title of the mortgagor.
In that case, the pertinent facts were these: the assignee
of two mortgages, both covering the same two tracts of land,
entered into possession of the mortgaged premises in 1919
under an agreement with the mortgagor whereby he was to
have possession for ten years, in consideration of which the
mortgage debts would be satisfied. In 1921, the assignee
assigned the senior mortgage to his wife. One of the tracts
was, in 1926, placed in execution for non-payment of taxes,
and was sold under such execution to the wife, who, at that
time, was the assignee and holder of the senior mortgage and
in possession of the mortgaged premises with her husband.
Action for partition was brought in 1943 by the children of
the assignees, both of them having died intestate. The sole
devisee under the will of the mortgagor was later made a
party defendant. The lower court held that the devisee of the
mortgagor was owner in fee of the real estate in question.
The judgment of the lower court was unanimously af-
firmed. After disposing of claims to title by adverse possession
or presumption of grant, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Fishburne said:
"By the weight of authority, a mortgagee cannot pur-
chase the mortgaged property at a tax sale and thus ac-
quire a title which will defeat the rights of the mortga-
gor, as the act of purchase at such sale is deemed to be
for the protection of the mortgagee's lien . . . It is re-
garded as inequitable to permit the mortgagee to acquire
title by purchasing the property for delinquent taxes and
$ Member Senior Class, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. 211 S. C. 223, 44 S. E. 2d 442 (1947).
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thereby defeat the title of the mortgagor. (Authorities
cited.)
"These rules are especially applicable where the mort-
gagee is in possession of the mortgaged premises, and is
therefore under obligation to pay the taxes thereon. (Au-
thorities cited.)"
It will be observed that though the mortgagee was actually
in possession, the Court apparently rests its decision on the
broad ground that a mortgagee cannot, under any circum-
stances, acquire a tax title and thereby defeat the rights of
the mortgagor.
The courts are generally in agreement that a mortgagee
who is in possession of the mortgaged property cannot acquire
a tax title which can be asserted, except for purposes of re-
imbursement, against the mortgagor or the owner of the
equity of redemption.2 The basis of the rule is that a mort-
gagee in possession is under the duty of paying the taxes, and
to permit him to obtain title through his failure to perform
this duty would be to allow him to take advantage of his own
wrong.3
A fortiori, a mortgagee in possession cannot acquire a tax
title as against the mortgagor where his possession is under
an agreement which expressly requires him to pay the taxes.4
Though it seems settled that a mortgagee in possession
cannot defeat the rights of a mortgagor by purchasing a title
at a tax sale, the authorities are by no means in accord where
the mortgagee is not in possession.
The weight of authority is that a mortgagee who has mere-
ly a lien on the mortgaged property cannot, so long as the re-
lation of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, obtain title to the
property as against the mortgagor by means of a tax sale,
particularly where, by contract or otherwise, he has the right,
in case the mortgagor permits the taxes to become delinquent,
to pay the same and add the amount so paid to his claim.5 This
right to pay the taxes is generally recognized independently
of statute, and even in the absence of a clause in the mort-
gage permitting the mortgagee to pay the taxes and add them
2. 140 A. L. R. 318.
3. 140 A. L. R. 318; Allen v. Dayton Hotel Co., 95 Tenn. 480, 32
S. W. 962 (1895).
4. Dusenberry v. Bidwell, 86 Kan. 666, 121 P. 1098 (1912).
5. 140 A. L. R. 302.
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to the mortgage debt upon failure of the mortgagor to do so.
Thus, it is said in Ragor v. Lomazx: 6
"But while it may not be the duty of the mortgagee to
pay the taxes, it is clearly his right to do so, for he has
a manifest interest in the protection of his mortgage
title ... The sum that he pays to discharge it [the tax
lien] goes to increase the amount of his encumbrance,
even if not so agreed in the mortgage, for it is the duty of
the mortgagor to protect the security he has given."
(Italics added.)
In South Carolina this right is expressly given by statute.
Section 2783 7 gives any mortgagee or any judgment creditor
the right to pay delinquent taxes and add them to the amount
of the debt secured by his mortgage or judgment. Section
8712-1 8 gives the same right when there is a clause author-
izing the mortgagee to make such advances. Both sections
further give such advancing creditor a first lien to the extent
of taxes so paid, which is, in effect, a subrogation to the rights
of the taxing power.
The principal reason advanced by those courts denying a
mortgagee the right to purchase at a tax sale and thereby
prevent the mortgagor from redeeming, is, that while it may
not be his duty, it is his right to do so for the protection of his
interest in the mortgaged property, and it is presumed that
when he does so purchase, it is for the protection and not
for the destruction of the regular title.9
In Middleton Saw. Bank v. Bacharach,10 it is said:
"A mortgagee is under no legal obligation to pay the
taxes, certainly as between himself and the mortgagor;
and yet he may be compelled to pay them in order to pro-
tect his mortgage... He may pay the tax and the amount
will be added to his debt, and he will hold the whole prop-
erty as security therefor. In such a case it is unneces-
sary to complicate the legal title with the tax deed, and
the law will not allow it to be done. It simply makes it his
duty to pay in default of the mortgagor."
6. 22 Ill. App. 628 (1887).
7. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942.
8. Ibid.
9. 37 Am. Jur., Sec. 1163, p. 417; Sec. 714, Jones on Mortgages (7th
Ed.); 140 A. L. R. 298; L. R. A. 1917D 523.
10. 46 Conn. 513 (1879).
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Another reason for the rule is that it would be inequitable
to permit the mortgagee to acquire title by purchasing at a
tax sale and thereby defeat the title of the mortgagor. The
mortgagor and mortgagee both having a unity of interest in
the protection of their title, it is deemed inequitable that
either of them should act adversely to the other in the pres-
ervation of the title in the maintenance of which they are
both concerned."
On the other hand; there is considerable authority for the
view that a mortgagee or other lien holder, who is not in pos-
session of the encumbered premises and is not under a con-
tractural obligation to pay the taxes thereon, may acquire
and hold a tax title in his own right as against the mort-
gagor.n
The primary reason advanced by these courts is that though
there may be a right in the mortgagee to pay the taxes and.
add them to the mortgage debt, it is nevertheless a right and
not a duty. It is on this particular point that most of the cases
differ-the majority, as pointed out above, saying that there
is a presumption that he purchased for the purpose of pro-
tecting the regular title rather than for the purpose of de-
stroying it, and the minority saying that no such presumption
exists, but rather that such purchase indicates an intention on
the part of the mortgagee to exercise his privilege of purchas-
ing the property rather than that of protecting his lien.
In Waterson v. Devoe,1" the Court, in determining the effect
of a statute giving a mortgagee the right to pay taxes, said:
"Such provision of the law gives him the choice, if he
desires, of paying the taxes, and secures him in the way
of a lien for the amount so paid. It does not make it ob-
ligatory upon him to do so, nor does it create the relation
of trust and confidence between him and the mortgagor."
(Italics added.)
In Jones v. Black,14 the right of the mortgagee to obtain
such a title is upheld on the ground that to hold otherwise
would be to allow the mortgagor to take advantage of his own
11. L. R. A. 1917D 524; Eck v. Swennumson, 73 Iowa 423, 35 N. W.
503 (1887); Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N. H. 22 (1879); Eblen v. Major,
147 Ky. 44, 143 S. W. 748 (1912).
12. 140 A. L. R. 297.
13. 18 Kan. 223 (1887).
14. 18 Okla. 344, 88 P. 1052 (1907).
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wrong. The Court goes on to say that the local statute nega-
tived the idea of any title in the mortgagee, and, further, that
the mortgagee's right to pay taxes did not make it obligatory
upon him to do so.
Although reference is made in several cases to the possi-
bility that the result in cases of this kind may depend upon
whether the mortgage conveyed the title to the mortgagee or
merely gave him a lien, according to an annotator in American
Law Reports, 5 the "only case" found in which the question
has been squarely passed on is Cauley v. Sutton 6 in which the
Court, after stating that North Carolina followed, the title
theory, said:
"The legal estate passes to the mortgagee, and he holds
it not only in trust for himself, but also for the mort-
gagor . . When the mortgagee bought at the sheriff's
sale he purchased only an encumbrance, the cost of which
he is entitled to have added to the debt secured by the
mortgage ... He did not acquire the equitable estate of
the mortgagor, which still exists, notwithstanding his pur-
chase at the tax sale, and he cannot use his deed for the
purpose of asserting any right in conflict with the mort-
gagor's equity of redemption."
In Waterson v. Devoe, supra, the Court states that the cases
which support the rule that the mortgagee cannot obtain a
tax title are made either in states where the common law
prevails as to the character of mortgages (title theory), or in
cases where the mortgagee was in the actual possession of the
premises.
It may be stated that generally (with, of course, some ex-
ceptions) the states that follow the lien theory allow a mort-
gagee to obtain a valid tax title against the mortgagor in the
absence of the mortgagee's possession of the mortgaged prop-
erty or a contractual duty on his part to pay the taxes, while
the states adhering to the title theory do not allow it, most
of them taking the view that since the mortgagee has the
title, his purchase at a tax sale merely amounts to the re-
moval of an encumbrance which may be added to the mort-
gage debt.
15. 140 A. L. R. 317.
16. 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3 (1909).
182
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Since, by Section 8701,17 South Carolina is a lien state, it
would appear to be among the exceptions mentioned above,
because, as previously pointed out, the decision in the prin-
cipal case was apparently based on the broad principle that
a mortgagee, in or out of possession, cannot acquire a tax title
and thereby defeat the rights of the mortgagor.
Another conflict in the decisions arises in regard to the
question whether the purchase of the mortgaged property by
the mortgagee at a tax sale extinguishes the mortgage debt.'8
The cases seem to be about evenly divided on this point.
The South Carolina cases, on the doctrine of merger, hold
to the effect that purchase by the mortgagee at any judicial
sale except a foreclosure sale to enforce his own lien, effects,
as a general rule, an extinguishment of the mortgage debt.19
The case of Devereux v. Taft 2 sustains the general prop-
osition that the purchase of land at a tax sale by the mort-
gagee extinguishes the debt secured by the mortgage on such
land.
Later, in Powell v. Patrick,21 where a bond was secured by
a real estate mortgage and a chattel mortgage, and the mort-
gaged land was purchased by the mortgagee at a tax sale,
the Court, after discussing the law of merger generally and
pointing out that in equity merger was primarily a matter
of intention of the parties, held that the bond was not ex-
tinguished.. The rights of the third parties had become in-
volved, and the Court desired to protect the estate of the mort-
gagee in the personal property. It said:
"If the Court should declare that the debt was extin-
guished, the vested rights of the mortgagee as the legal
owner of the personal property, after condition broken,
or the rights of third parties, might thereby be injurious-
ly affected. Under such circumstances, the Court, in the
exercise of its chancery powers, will refuse to declare
the debt extinguished."
17. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942.
18. 95 A. L. R. 98.
19. Schnell v. Schroder, Bailey Eq. 334 (1831); McLure, Brawley, &
Co. v. Wheeler, 6 Rich Eq. 343 (1853); Trimmier v. Vise, 17 S. C. 500
(1882).
20. 20 S. C. 555 (1884).
21. 64 S. C. 190, 41 S. E. 894 (1902).
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In Ex parte Powell,2 it was held that the purchase at a tax
sale of one of the tracts of land covered by a mortgage cover-
ing two tracts extinguished the mortgage debt only to the ex-
tent of the real value-not the sale price-of the tract pur-
chased.
In many of the states, it is held that such purchase of a
tax title does not destroy the debt or affect the mortgagee's
right to enforce it. The difference in the decisions seem to
be attributable, in -most instances, to the different applica-
tions of the law of merger as made by the courts. Intention,
actual or presumed, of the person in whom the interests are
united is generally the basis on which the decisions will rest.2
But the courts are not uniform in their decisions as to the
manner of determining intention, and this seems to be the
true reason for the conflict in the decisions.24
A question arises here as to the effect of the principal case
on the South Carolina cases last mentioned above. In all those
cases the mortgagee was permitted to buy the land. No ques-
tion as to the propriety of such purchases arose, but the issue
was whether the debt had been extinguished. In the principal
case the debt had been extinguished by virtue of the agree-
ment to give the mortgagee possession for ten years, and the
question was the propriety of the purchase at the tax sale.
Does this decision in effect overrule the earlier ones? Does it
prevent a mortgagee, under any or all circumstances, from
purchasing the mortgaged property at a tax sale except for
the benefit of the mortgagor? Does the mortgagor have a right
to elect which way the purchase shall be treated? The writer
ventures no opinion on these questions.
It might be well to mention briefly the effect of the
converse of the situation above discussed, i.e., the effect, as
against the mortgagee, of the mortgagor's acquiring a tax
title.
Almost without exception the cases support the general
proposition that a mortgagor cannot buy in a tax title and
assert it successfully against the mortgage.Z The basis us-
ually suggested for the rule is that it is the duty of the mort-
22. 68 S. C. 324, 47 S. E. 440 (1904).
23. 95 A. L. R. 89.
24. 95 A. L. R. 90, 91.
25. 134 A. L. R. 290, and cases cited; 1 Glenn on Mortgages Sec. 43,
p. 273; 2 Jones on Mortgages (7th Ed.) Sec. 680, p. 37.
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gagor to keep the taxes paid and that he cannot be allowed to
derive an advantage from his own wrong in permitting them
to go unpaid.2 In some cases the duty of the mortgagor has
been attributed to particular covenants or conditions in the
mortgage, and in others to the relationship between the par-
ties, or to the fact that the mortgagor was in possession and
receiving rents and profits therefrom.2"
This rule has been held to apply where such purchase is
made by, or in the name of, another, but in the mortgagor's
interest.28
This question was passed on in South Carolina in Inter-
state Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Waters.29 In that case the mort-
gaged property had been purchased at a tax sale by the Sink-
ing Fund Commission. The mortgagor then borrowed money
and got a deed from the Sinking Fund Commission, but the
deed was taken in the name of his wife. The mortgagee then
brought an action to set aside the tax deed and to foreclose
the mortgage. The Court, in finding for the plaintiff, said in
part:
"It is clear that a mortgagor cannot, by his negligence
or fraud, suffer the mortgaged lands to be sold for taxes,
and then, by purchase at the tax sale, or, after forfeit-
ure, from the Sinking Fund Commission, acquire a title
which he may set up to defeat the mortgagee's lien on
said property. A court of equity could not tolerate this.
What cannot be done directly, will not be permitted to
be done indirectly. Therefore,-a court of equity could
not pernfit the wife of the mortgagor, or any other per-
son, to acquire such a title to the detriment of the mort-
gagee, as the result of a deliberate scheme between the
purchaser and the mortgagor to defeat the lien of the
mortgage. Such conduct would estop the purchaser from
asserting such title against the mortgage lien."
It thus clearly appears from the above that the rule oper-
ates not only against a purchase by the mortgagor at the tax
sale, but also against a subsequent acquisition of such title
directly or through mesne coAveyances from a third person
who purchased thereat, even though such title would have
26. 134 A. L. R. 292.
27. 134 A. L. R. 294, 296, and cases cited.
28. 134 A. L. R. 298.
29. 50 S. C. 459, 27 S. E. 948 (1897).
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been good in the hands of such person. This rule is generally
accepted in all jurisdictions.3D
It appears, therefore, that South Carolina, though the ques-
tions herein discussed have not often arisen for determination
here, has followed the general rules and weight of authority
whenever such questions have arisen, except perhaps as to
the effect on the mortgage debt when the tax title and the
mortgage lien meet in the same person. As to that, as stated
above, the cases are fairly evenly divided.
Attention should be called to several statutes which, to
greater or less extent, protect a mortgagee from losing his
lien by means of a tax sale.
Section 2573 31 requires the sheriff, before proceeding to
advertise property levied upon for taxes for sale, to give
twenty days written notice to all holders of mortgages on
such property who shall list such mortgage, as to which no-
tice is desired, with the clerk of court of the county in which
the land lies on or before the fifteenth day of March of each
year. This section further provides that unless such notice
is given and other provisions are complied with by the sheriff
and the clerk of court, the rights of mortgagees complying
with the statute will not be affected. Mortgagees not so com-
plying are protected to the extent of any right or remedy ex-
isting independently of this statute.
Section 2775 n provides, among other things, that upon
application, at any time before sale under tax execution, of
any mortgagee of property which is assessed for taxation,
the county auditor shall apportion the share due by the owner
upon the portion or interest mortgaged. The tax collecting
officer is then directed to receive from the mortgagee the pro-
portionate share of taxes upon such part or interest mort-
gaged and to give a receipt therefor, which receipt shall dis-
charge such portion or interest mortgaged from all taxes and
costs assessed against the owner. This right exists after the
property has been advertised for sale under tax execution,
provided the mortgagee also pays the pro rata cost of the ad-
vertisement, and the sale shall continue as to the remaining
property.
30. 134 A. L. R. 302, and cases cited.
31. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942.
32. Ibid.
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Section 2820 2 requires the sheriff conducting a tax sale
to wait until the expiration of twelve months from the day
of sale before executing his deed to the purchaser at such sale.
During this twelve months, the owner, grantee, mortgagee,
or judgment creditor of such land may redeem from the sale
by paying to the sheriff the taxes, penalties, costs and ex-
penses of the sale, together with seven per cent interest on
the purchase price paid by the bidder, and all amounts paid
by the bidder as taxes on said property. Such amount paid
to redeem is added to the mortgage debt or other lien, with
the same incidents as to priority, with the same rate of in-
terest, and collectible in the same way as the original mort-
gage or judgment debt. The sheriff is required to give not less
than thirty days' notice, before making title to the purchaser
at the tax sale, to any mortgagee or assignee of any mort-
gage appearing of record within ten years of such seizure
in order that such mortgagee or assignee may have oppor-
tunity to redeem. In the event the land is not redeemed, the
sheriff is directed, upon written notice given or information
obtained from the records, to hold any excess over taxes and
costs for the benefit of mortgage or lien creditors according
to priority, until authorized or directed by proper judicial
authority as to the proper mode of disposition, or by the writ-
ten consent of the defaulting taxpayer that the excess be paid
over to such mortgage or lien creditors.
33. Ibid.
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